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Review In The European Union
Darren HARVEY*
This article provides an analysis of contemporary case law and subsequent academic commentary
which suggests that a more process-oriented approach to proportionality review has recently been
taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union. It argues that the manner in which process-
oriented review has been utilized gives rise to a fundamental reconceptualization of the nature of
the proportionality test at the EU level; moving away from a substantive, merits based concept of
review towards something more akin to a procedural obligation to state the reasons which
underpin a contested measure. The article highlights some of the problems that have arisen
from this shift in approach from both a doctrinal and a theoretical perspective, whilst demonstrat-
ing the inconsistent way in which the Court has formulated and applied process-oriented
proportionality review to date.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to recently elected Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
President Koen Lenaerts, recent case-law reveals that the Court now strives to
develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political
institutions of the EU adopt their decisions.1 In so doing, the CJEU decides not to
second guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator
and instead opts to examine whether, in reaching a particular outcome when
adopting an act of general application, the EU’s political institutions have followed
the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties.2
In this way it is argued that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive
outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’.3 In particular,
under a more process-oriented approach to proportionality review, the Court
now requires that the EU law-maker demonstrate that it has taken into con-
sideration all the relevant interests at stake before enacting laws.4 The great
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merit in this shift towards a form of ‘process-oriented review’ by the CJEU,
according to Lenaerts, is that it increases judicial scrutiny over the decision-
making process of the EU whilst preventing the Court from intruding into the
realm of politics.5
There would appear to be considerable support in the literature for the turn
towards process-oriented review. Commenting upon the ‘significant changes’ that
have taken place with regards to judicial review of legislation in the EU and many
Member States in recent years, Meßerschmidt states that these changes ‘comprise
the growing interest in the procedural requirements of legislation on the one hand
and evidence-based legislation on the other hand’.6 In contrast to traditional
jurisprudence which paid little attention to the input and the impact of legislation,7
therefore, it is claimed by some that the contemporary practice of various inter-
national and national courts demonstrates that courts not only consider the ‘output’
of the political process in the form of enacted legal rules, but also evaluate the
‘input’ of such law making processes.8
Groussot and Bogojevi! recognize a procedural trend in the CJEU’s case law,
stating that the Court has applied ‘procedural proportionality’ in certain cases
dealing with the vertical allocation of regulatory powers.9 Alemanno notes a
‘new judicial trend’ in which ‘courts may examine the legislature’s decision-
making process as part of their determination of the substantive constitutionality
of legislation’10 Taking a broader, inter-jurisdictional perspective whilst making
direct reference to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, Mak notes that judicial
deference to the political process appears to have given way to a stricter review
of legislative and administrative decision making.11 Furthermore, and in contrast
to the way in which the proportionality principle has traditionally been con-
ceived as a ground of review in the EU context, Hofmann has noted that
‘Increasingly … in the context of review of legislative acts of the Union, the
CJEU does not review the substance of an act but instead checks whether the
5 Ibid., at 15.
6 Klaus Meßerschmidt, The Race to Rationality Review and the Score of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, 6 Legisprudence 347, 348 (2012).
7 Ibid.
8 Elaine Mak, Judicial Review of Regulatory Instruments: The Least Imperfect Alternative? 6 Legisprudence
301, 310 (2012).
9 Xavier Groussot & Sanja Bogojevi!, Subsidiarity as a Procedural Safeguard of Federalism, in The Question of
Competence in the European Union, 246 (Azoulai ed., Oxford University Press 2014). For an overview of
‘Proceduralized’ Proportionality in relation to the CJEU’s review of Member State measures in the
Internal Market, see Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms 191–192
(OUP 2013).
10 Alberto Alemanno, The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex: A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s
Semiprocedural Review, 1 Theory & Prac. Legis. 327 (2013).
11 Mak, supra n. 8, at 313.
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institutions can prove that they themselves reviewed the proportionality of a
measure before adopting it.’12
In light of this emerging procedural trend, the purpose of this article is to
examine the extent to which a shift towards a more process-oriented approach
to proportionality review may indeed be detected within the case law of the
CJEU. It shall be demonstrated that the manner in which the Court has
formulated and applied this more process-oriented approach to proportionality
review is far from consistent, with it being possible to detect several ambiguities
in the reasoning of the Court’s case law. Furthermore, the manner in which
process-oriented review has been utilized by the Court gives rise to a funda-
mental reconceptualization of the nature of the proportionality test at the EU
level; moving away from a substantive, merits based concept of review towards
something more akin to a procedural obligation to state the reasons which
underpin a contested measure.
As a result, the manner in which the Court now applies the proportionality
principle is no longer predicated upon how intensively it will review the merits
of a contested legal measure; but instead rests upon the level at which it sets the
justificatory threshold for the EU law-maker to demonstrate that its measures
are lawful. In carrying out this exercise, the Court has to date indicated a
willingness to uncritically accept the assertions and evidence adduced by the
law-maker at face value, thus arguably setting the justificatory threshold at a
very low level.
Section 2 outlines the distinction that exists between process and substance
within judicial review proceedings at the EU level. Section 3 discusses the
principle of proportionality as traditionally conceived in EU jurisprudence and
academic discourse. Section 4 considers recent developments in the case law
which suggest a more process-oriented approach being taken by the Court.
Sections 5 and 6 analyse the potential implications of these changes. Section 7
is a conclusion.
2 THE PROCESS/SUBSTANCE DISTINCTION IN EU JUDICIAL
REVIEW
According to Article 263(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), the CJEU is limited to four grounds when reviewing the legality of
measures enacted by the EU’s law-making institutions: lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the
12 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, General Principles of EU Law and EU Administrative Law, in European Union
Law 196, 205 (Barnard and Peers eds, OUP 2014).
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treaties or any rule of law relating to their application and misuse of powers.13
Three of these grounds for review (lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement and misuse of powers) speak to a ‘procedural’
or ‘formal’ conception of judicial review in which the substance or merits of
the measures of law are, for the most part, beyond the review powers of the
Court.14
Of these three, the duty to state reasons upon which legal acts are based (now
enshrined in Article 296 TFEU) – which forms an integral part of the infringement
of an essential procedural requirement ground of review – has played an important
role in the jurisprudence of the Court.15 The statement of reasons must show
clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the EU authority which adopted the
measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the
adopted measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. That
being said, such a statement is not required go into every relevant point of fact and
law.16 In this regard, the question whether the obligation to provide a statement of
reasons has been satisfied must be assessed with reference not only to the wording
of the measure but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing
the matter in question.17 In terms of how this operates in judicial proceedings, it is
clear that a failure to provide an adequate statement of reasons for a decision will
prevent the Court from ruling on the arguments relating to the substantive
correctness of the contested decision, thus leading the Court to annul the measure
on procedural grounds.18
In contrast, ‘infringement of the treaties or any rule of law relating to their
application’ is a residual ground of review that the Court has used to import a
number of unwritten general principles of law into the EU legal order.19
According to Schutze, this development of general principles by the Court has
added a substantive dimension to the rule of law, according to which the Court
may review the substantive content or merit of a measure of EU law to determine
whether, inter alia, it is based upon a manifest error of assessment,20 complies with
13 Art. 263(2) Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 Dec.
2007, 2008/C 115/01.
14 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law 265–266 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
15 ‘The duty to give reasons is one of the essential procedural requirements within the meaning of the
first paragraph of [Art. 263(2) TFEU], breach of which gives rise to a claim.’ [Parenthesis added.]
Jurgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law 1401 (Sweet and Maxwell 1992).
16 Case C122/94 Commission v. Council [1996] ECR I-881, para. [29]; Joined Cases C154/04 and
C155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others [2005] ECR I6451, para. [133].
17 Case C- 63/12 Commission v. Council, EU:C:2013:752, para. [99] and case law cited therein.
18 E.g. Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale et al. v. Commission,
2003, ECR II-435, paras [419–420].
19 Schütze, supra n. 14, at 266.
20 Case C-77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda v. Ministero della Salute. [2010] ECR I-13533,
para. [57].
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fundamental rights,21 contradicts the principle of legitimate expectations,22 or
complies with the principle of proportionality.23
There is therefore a distinction between procedural and substantive legality in
the EU legal order – a distinction which has been said to constitute one of the
cornerstones, not to say the central pillar, of judicial review doctrine in the EU.24
Whilst it has been noted that the two are closely linked – with indications of a
defect in the substance of a contested measure possibly being revealed in the
statement of reasons, thus making the statement of reasons an authoritative source
of information25 – it has been stressed that within the EU legal order:
it is important to adhere to the principle of the distinction between the infringement of the
duty to state reasons, as an essential procedural requirement, on the one hand, and its
function as an indicator of substantive defects in the decision to be examined, on the other
hand.26
It is ‘consistent with this distinction’ for the EU law-maker to be able to satisfy the
procedural duty to state reasons by setting out the ‘conceptions on which the
decision is based without regard to the substantive correctness of the reasons
given’.27 This is clearly illustrated in Commission v. Parliament and Council where
it is noted that:
it must be remembered that absence of reasons or inadequacy of the reasons stated goes to
an issue of infringement of essential procedural requirements within the meaning of
[Article 263(2) TFEU], and constitutes a plea distinct from a plea relating to the substantive
legality of the contested measure, which goes to infringement of a rule of law relating to
the application of the Treaty within the meaning of that article.28
This is further demonstrated by the way in which the Court routinely deals with
substantive grounds of review such as proportionality independently of any con-
sideration of whether the procedural duty to provide reasons under Article 296
TFEU.29
21 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
22 Case C-265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens BV v. Commission [1987] ECR, 1155; See generally
E. Sharpston, Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality, 15 Eur. L. Rev. 103, 108–115 (1990).
23 Schütze, supra n. 14, at 267.
24 Hanns Peter Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law 145 (Bloomsbury 1999).
25 Schwarze, supra n. 15, at 1402–1403; See also Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law 353 (OUP 2012).
26 Schwarze, supra n. 15, at 1403; See also Joana Mendes, Participation in EU Rule-Making: A Rights-Based
Approach 252 (OUP 2011).
27 Schwarze, supra n. 15, at 1403.
28 Case C-378/00 Commission v. Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I-937 para. [34].
29 E.g. Case C- 508/13 Estonia v. Parliament and Council [2015] not yet reported, where the principle of
proportionality was examined first at para. [28], followed by the duty to provide a statement of reasons
at para. [57]. Given that the duty to provide reasons is said to help facilitate substantive review, it is
somewhat puzzling that the Court considers whether this procedural obligation has been complied
with after it has conducted its proportionality assessment. Not only would a failure to provide adequate
reasons lead to the measure’s annulment without having to enquire into its substantive content, one
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Moreover, the consequences of annulment on procedural or substantive
grounds differ considerably.30 Annulment under the former leaves the EU law-
maker in a position to remedy the procedural defect e.g. provide a statement of
reasons and issue the same decision without having to alter the substantive content
of the contested measure at all.31 In contrast, annulment under the latter results in
the EU law-maker being required to re-open the law-making process so as to
revise the measure and bring its substantive contents into compliance with the
operative part of the Court’s judgement. The result, in most cases, will be that the
new measure will differ substantially in content from the previous measure that was
annulled.32
In light of this brief overview, it falls to consider the claims that contemporary
CJEU jurisprudence demonstrates a more process-oriented approach to the prin-
ciple of proportionality being taken by the Court.
3 THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
The principle of proportionality as applied by the CJEU when reviewing the
legality of measures of EU law may be said to consist of three sub-principles.
The first, suitability stage, requires that the measure under review is suitable or
appropriate to achieve the objectives it pursues.33 The second, necessity stage,
involves an assessment of whether less restrictive means could have been used to
achieve the aim pursued. Finally, the third stage in the proportionality analysis –
which is often either treated without distinction from the second stage in the
Court’s case law,34 or simply left out entirely – enquires into whether the measure
under review was excessive, meaning whether the means employed went beyond
the aim pursued.35
According to Craig, one may distinguish between three different types of cases
in which the Court applies the principle of proportionality: cases involving
discretionary policy choices; cases concerning the infringement of a right
wonders whether these reasons really do have much impact upon the Court’s prior in time propor-
tionality assessment.
30 Nehl, supra n. 24, at 146.
31 Ibid., at 147 at fn. 210.
32 Ibid., at 146; Hans Peter Nehl, Good Administration as Procedural Right and/or General Principle?, in Legal
Challenges in EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration 335 (Hofmann and Turk eds,
Edward Elgar 2009).
33 Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 Eur. L.J. 158, 165 (2010).
34 Takis Tridimas, Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of
Scrutiny, in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 65 (Ellis ed., Hart Publisihing 1999).
35 Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe & Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the
European Union 130 (OUP 2011); Craig notes that the Court will tend not to raise the third limb of the
proportionality test of its own volition See Craig, supra n. 25, at 601–604.
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recognized by EU law; and cases involving a disproportionate penalty or financial
burden. Whilst cognizant of the fact that a clear-cut distinction is not always easy
to draw between these categories, the present article shall deal primarily with the
first of these; that is, discretionary policy choices which, for the most part, do not
entail a fundamental rights dimension.36
In general, the CJEU operates a two-step proportionality test when reviewing
discretionary policy choices of the EU institutions, ensuring that measures are
suitable for attaining the objective pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary
to achieve that purpose.37 According to Tridimas, the tests of suitability and
necessity enable the CJEU to review not only the legality, but also to some extent
the merits of legislative and administrative action at the EU level.38 It is for this
reason that proportionality is perceived as ‘the most far reaching ground of review,
the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the public law judge’.39 This is echoed by
Shapiro: ‘Proportionality … is obviously the strongest form of substantive review.
In effect, courts are saying ‘We invalidate the law you have made because we can
think of a better law -one that achieves your goals at less cost to competing
interests.”40
The extent to which the proportionality principle will be effective in judicial
review cases depends, however, on how strictly the Court applies the suitability
and necessity tests and how far it is willing to defer to the choices made by the
authority that issued the measure under review.41 In other words, the interrelation
between legislative discretion and judicial scrutiny i.e. the balance to be struck
between judicial control and discretion attributed to the EU law-maker – which
has been said to be an ‘eternal’ question of any system of constitutional justice42 –
is of central importance to the operability of the proportionality test in the EU
legal order.43
36 Craig, supra n. 25, at 590.
37 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11, 12 & 194/04, ABNA and others, [2005] ECR I-10423, para. [68],
Case C-535/03, Unitymark, [2006] ECR I-2689.
38 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 140 (OUP 2006).
39 Ibid., at 139. Indeed, the fact that proportionality involves a judicial assessment of the merits of
contested measures is what raises the prospect of a substitution of judgment by courts for that of the
primary decision-maker, thus rendering it controversial in some circles. Instructive here is the debate
within common law legal scholarship. See generally Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference in Administrative
Law: Basis, Application and Scope (CUP 2012), Ch. 5.
40 Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement 179, 217 (University of Chicago Legal Forum 1992).
41 Schutze notes that a court’s capacity to review the exercise of legislative or executive power ranges
from classifying it as a non-justiciable political question to fully substituting a political compromise
with a judicial solution. In between these two extremes lies various different standards of review of
which the CJEU applies a ‘manifestly inappropriate’ test. Robert Schutze, EU Competences: Existence
and Exercise, in The Oxford Handbook of EU Law 100 (Arnull and Chalmers eds, OUP 2015).
42 Thomas Von Danwitz, The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, 37 Fordham Intl. L.J.
1311, 1328 (2013).
43 Craig, supra n. 25, at 592.
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In this regard the CJEU generally grants a wide margin of discretion to the
EU law-maker whenever discretionary policy choices are involved, typically stat-
ing that: ‘in the exercise of the powers conferred on it the [Union] legislature must
be allowed a broad discretion in areas in which its action involves political,
economic and social choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex
assessments and evaluations.’44 Within the context of the proportionality test, this
granting of broad discretion results in the Court adopting a very low-intensity
standard of review: ‘Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere
can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the
objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.’45
The outcome of formulating discretion in such broad terms so as to cover
almost any field of Union action is that the low intensity, ‘manifestly inappropriate’
standard of proportionality review is the norm.46 Nevertheless – and it is important
to stress this point at this juncture in light of the argument which follows – the
prevalent view in both academia and the judiciary is that this low-intensity
approach to proportionality review does not call into question the fundamental
characteristic of such review; namely, an examination of the merits of a contested
measure.47
For example, in ABNA the CJEU found that a provision in a Directive aimed
at protecting public health by requiring manufacturers, on request by a customer,
to notify the latter in writing of the exact percentages by weight of the feed
materials used in feedstuffs contravened the principle of proportionality. In the
Court’s view, having examined the arguments of the parties, an obligation of that
nature could not be justified by the objective of protecting public health and, in its
view, manifestly went beyond what was necessary to attain that objective.48
Likewise, in IATA the claimants argued, inter alia, that the obligations to
assist, care for and compensate passengers contained in an EU Regulation in the
event of cancellation of, or a long delay to, a flight were by reason of the
considerable financial charges which they will impose on European air carriers
totally disproportionate to the objective pursued. In deciding the case the CJEU
first set down its classic two-step proportionality test before stipulating that it was
44 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] I-11453, para. [123]; Case C-380/03 Germany
v. Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573, para. [145]; Case C-284/95 Safety Hi-Tech [1998]
ECR I-4301, para. [37].
45 Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] I-11453, para. [123].
46 Harbo notes that the manifestly inappropriate test has been utilized by the CJEU in cases involving
economic policy, public health, common agricultural policy, fisheries, transport and social policy. See
Harbo, supra n. 33, at 178–179.
47 Craig, supra n. 25, at 595. For a particularly clear judicial statement of the substantive, merits based
nature of proportionality review see Advocate General Kokott opinion in Case C-558/07 SPCM and
others [2009] ECR I-5783, paras 73–77.
48 Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11, 12 & 194/04, ABNA and others, [2005] ECR I-10423, para. [83].
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for the Court to first assess whether the measures adopted were manifestly
inappropriate in the light of the regulation’s explicit objective.49 In so doing,
the Court quite clearly gave its own substantive evaluation of the merits of the
contested measure, noting that the obligations ‘do not appear to be manifestly
inappropriate merely because carriers cannot rely on the extraordinary circum-
stances defence.’50 It also did not ‘appear unreasonable for those obligations
initially to be borne, subject to the abovementioned right to compensation, by
the air carriers with which the passengers concerned have a contract of carriage
that entitles them to a flight that should be neither cancelled nor delayed.’51
Furthermore, ‘the obligation does not appear manifestly inappropriate to the
objective pursued’ and ‘the amount of the compensation, set at EUR 250, EUR
400 or EUR 600 depending on the distance of the flights concerned, likewise
does not appear excessive’.52
4 PROCESS-ORIENTED PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: A SHIFT
IN APPROACH?
In more recent times, however, it has been asserted that CJEU jurisprudence has
indicated a shift towards a process-oriented conception of proportionality review
in which judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counter-
balanced by a strict ‘process review’.53 It has been said that under this more
procedural conception of proportionality, the CJEU now requires the EU law-
maker to present and explain material relied upon during the law-making process
in order to justify its actions.54 This has led to the Court now viewing its main task
as being one of ‘imposing a duty on the legislature to give careful prior considera-
tion and to conduct an assessment of all relevant economic and scientific data
justifying the adoption of a measure’.55 According to Keyaerts, the principle of
proportionality has thus recently ‘contributed to a rationalization in lawmaking’,
with the CJEU using the principle to focus upon ‘justification, procedural, or care,
49 Case C- 344/04 IATA [2006] ECR I-403, paras 79–83.
50 Ibid., para. 86.
51 Ibid., para. 90.
52 Ibid., para. 91.
53 Lenaerts, supra n. 1, at 4.
54 David Keyaerts, Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs : Does the European Court of Justice Bark or Bite?, in The
Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance 269, 280 (Mazmanyan & Vandenbruwaene
eds, Intersentia 2013); Popelier & Verlinden, The Context of the Rise of Ex Ante Evaluation, in The
Impact of Legislation. A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation 13, 31 (Verschuuren ed., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2009).
55 Loic Azoulai, The Complex Weave of Harmonization, in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law
589, 597 (Arnull & Chalmers eds, OUP 2015).
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standards in lawmaking’56; whilst cautiously recognizing that the case law of the
CJEU seems to have recently shifted towards a more intensive review of proce-
dural requirements, including an interesting role for ex ante evaluations including
Impact Assessments (IAs).57
In this way, ‘the case law of the CJEU has shifted towards a reasonableness
test’ in which the EU law-maker must ‘present justification material as proof of
reasonable action’58 and that ‘actions of the lawmaker are considered reasonable
when they are supported by facts and relevant arguments’.59
4.1 SPAIN V. COUNCIL
The case of Spain v. Council may be cited as a foundational moment by those
claiming that there has been a shift towards a more process-oriented proportion-
ality review by the CJEU. In that case, the Court annulled a Council Regulation
in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) field on the grounds that it infringed
the principle of proportionality.60
The Court held that acts adopted by EU institutions must not exceed the
limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate
objectives pursued by the law in question; where there is a choice between several
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disad-
vantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.61 That being
said, where the legislature enjoys broad discretion the legality of the measure can
only be affected if it is manifestly inappropriate in terms of the objective pursued.62
From this orthodox starting point the Court seemingly introduced something
new into its proportionality assessment. According to the CJEU, even though
judicial review is of limited scope in areas where the legislature enjoys broad
discretion, it nevertheless requires the EU institutions which have adopted the
act in question to show that in adopting that act they ‘actually exercised their
discretion’ and that this ‘presupposes the taking into consideration of all the
relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to
regulate’.63 ‘It follows that the institutions must at the very least be able to produce
56 Keyaerts, supra n. 54, at 281.
57 David Keyaerts, Ex Ante Evaluation of EU Legislation Intertwined with Judicial Review? 35 Eur. L. Rev.
869, 882 (2010). Similarly, Von Danwitz, supra n. 42, at 1330.
58 Keyaerts, supra n. 54, at 282.
59 Ibid., at 280; see also Popelier & Verlinden, supra n. 54.
60 Case C-310/04 Spain v. Council [2006] ECR I-7285.
61 Ibid., para. [97].
62 Ibid., para. [98].
63 Ibid., para. [122].
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and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into
account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on which the exercise
of their discretion depended.’64
Based on this ‘new test’,65 the Court found that there was a breach of the
proportionality principle since the EU legislature had failed to sufficiently take
account of basic facts in two respects. First, by not taking labour costs into
consideration when conducting a preparatory study that formed the basis for the
Council’s decision,66 and second, by not conducting an assessment of the potential
socio-economic effects of the proposed reform in the cotton sector, especially since
such studies had been carried out in connection with reforms in other sectors.67
In light of this, the Court ultimately found that the Council had not shown
that it had actually exercised its discretion in adopting the contested measure –
something which would have involved the taking into consideration of basic
facts – and consequently it was concluded that the principle of proportionality
had been infringed.68 In reaching this conclusion, however, the reasoning of the
Court was somewhat ambiguous as to the manifestly disproportionate nature of
the contested measure. As Groussot has noted, the CJEU ‘merely stated that the
Council failed to take account of the basic factors (labour costs and impact
study) … Indeed, there was no explicit mention that the Council committed a
manifest error of assessment leading to the resulting measure being manifestly
inappropriate and therefore contrary to the general principle of
proportionality.’69
It is submitted that this can be explained by a shift from a substantive, merits
based conception of the proportionality principle to a procedural obligation to state
reasons in the case. By phrasing the annulment in terms of a procedural failure to
demonstrate the exercise of discretion by taking account of relevant facts and
circumstances, rather than in terms of the measure being substantively manifestly
inappropriate (e.g. in ABNA), the Court may indeed be understood to be counter-
balancing deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ with a form of ‘process
review’.70
64 Ibid., para. [123].
65 Xavier Groussot, Case C-310/04, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union, 44 Com. Mkt.
L. Rev. 761, 777 (2007); Anneli Albi, Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession
Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums, 15 Eur. L.J. 46, 61 (2009); Werner Vandenbruwaene,
Multi-Tiered Political Questions: The ECJ’s Mandate in Enforcing Subsidiarity, 6 Legisprudence 321, 340
(2012).
66 Spain v. Council, supra n. 60, paras 124–127.
67 Ibid., paras 103, 128.
68 Ibid., para. [133].
69 Groussot, supra n. 65, at 781.
70 Lenaerts, supra n. 1, at 4.
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When viewed from this perspective, it makes more sense to refer to the
Court’s decision to annul the measure as being premised upon a breach of a
procedural duty to give reasons. Indeed, as Sauter has noted, the manifestly
disproportionate standard which has traditionally characterized the low-intensity,
merits based approach to proportionality review took on the quality of a failure to
state reasons in Spain v. Council.71 This understanding of the decision appears to
have been followed by the European General Court (EGC) in Sungro, S.A. where
it was stated that in Spain v. Council ‘it was not the contested provisions themselves,
but the failure to take account of all the relevant factors and circumstances, in
particular by carrying out a study of the reform’s impact, before their adoption
which was criticized from the point of view of an infringement of the principle of
proportionality’.72
In terms of the CJEU’s reference to the lack of an IA73 in Spain v. Council, it
has been noted that whilst it would be unreasonable to interpret the decision as
imposing a general obligation on the EU legislature to perform an IA, the
outcome of the case could have been different had such an assessment been
carried out:
According to the a contrario reasoning of the judgment, it seems that this would have
enabled the Court to assess whether the EU institutions ‘had exceeded the limits of what is
appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the
legislation in question.’ In other words, an IA would have facilitated the Court’s task of
determining whether the challenged measure ‘was manifestly appropriate.’74
This too implicitly accepts the shift towards a procedural duty to provide reasons
conception of review here, since it suggests that the mere production of an IA
may be sufficient to convince the Court that various different measures had been
considered and thus that the contested measure itself was proportionate. If
correct, the question for the Court under such a process-oriented notion of
proportionality would no longer be whether the contested measure is itself
71 Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-003, 1,
14, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208467 (accessed 18 Feb. 2016).
72 Cases T-252/07, T-271/07, and T-272/07, Sungro, SA, Eurosemillas, SA, Surcotton, SA [2010] ECR
II-55, para. [60].
73 Impact Assessments (IA) are non-binding Commission documents compiled during the preparatory
stages of EU law-making which are used, inter alia, to help EU institutions design better policies and
laws; to facilitate better informed decision-making throughout the legislative process; to take into
account input from a wide variety of external stakeholders; to provide transparency on the benefits and
costs of different policy alternatives and to ensure that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
are respected. See Impact Assessment Guidelines SEC (2009) 92 s. 1.3; Most recently see Better
Regulation Guidelines COM(2015) 215 final.
74 Alberto Alemanno, A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment, 17 Eur. Pub. L. 485, 501 (2011); Groussot &
Bogojevi!, supra n. 9, at 248.
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proportionate, but whether the law-maker plausibly considered it to be so as
demonstrated by some form of justificatory evidence. (see Section 6 below).75
4.2 VODAFONE
Following its decision in Spain v. Council, the Court has failed to adopt the ‘actually
exercised its discretion’ formulation of the proportionality principle when adopting
a more process-oriented approach to judicial review.76 Instead, in a number of
cases the Court – whilst continuing to grant the EU law-maker broad discretion
and repeating the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard of review – has introduced a
requirement that the EU law-maker demonstrate that it has based measures on
‘objective criteria’.
For example, in Vodafone, a case concerning a challenge to a Regulation
setting maximum prices for mobile phone roaming charges, the CJEU began by
stipulating a two-step proportionality test that measures be appropriate for attaining
the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve them.77
The important point to note here, however, is that the Court then stated that
even though the EU legislature had a broad discretion in the area, it nevertheless
must base its choice upon objective criteria. Furthermore, in assessing the burdens
associated with various possible measures, it must examine whether objectives
pursued by the measure chosen are such as to justify even substantial negative
economic consequences for certain operators.78
In conducting such an examination the CJEU found the contested measure
to be suitable since the EU legislature had carried out an exhaustive study,
summarized in the IA, which showed that the Commission had examined
various regulatory options and assessed their economic impact before exercising
its discretion in deciding to regulate roaming charges.79 The Court also referred
to the arguments of the EU law-maker, including references to an IA and the
explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a Regulation, and accepted their
75 This much is indeed made explicit ‘What better way for the EU legislature to prove “the taking into
consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to
regulate” than by producing an IA before the ECJ?’ Alemanno, supra n. 74, at 501.
76 The terminology of ‘actually exercised its discretion’ which ‘presupposes the taking into consideration
of all the relevant factors’ has come instead to be used by the Court when reviewing whether the EU
law-maker has committed a manifest error of assessment – often a distinct ground of substantive
judicial review. See Case T-93/10 Bilbaína de Alquitranes and others v. ECHA [2013] ECR II-0000,
para. [77]; Case T 689/13 Bilbaína de Alquitranes [2015], not yet reported, para. [24].
77 Case C-58/08 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-04999, para. [51].
78 Ibid., para. [53].
79 Ibid., para. [55].
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findings when concluding at the necessity stage of its proportionality assessment
that no less restrictive measures would have been equally effective at achieving
the contested measure’s aims.80 Finally, despite alluding to the third-step of the
proportionality test, it is clear that the Court did not engage in an assessment of
whether the objectives pursued by the measure were such as to justify even
substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators. Instead, with-
out giving weight to the interests of private parties, the CJEU simply held that
the Regulation was proportionate due to the importance of the objective of
consumer protection and the limited duration of the intervention ‘even if it
might have negative economic consequences for certain operators, is propor-
tionate to the aim pursued’.81
Accordingly, in light of the EU legislature’s broad discretion, the Court found
that it could legitimately take the view that less restrictive measures would not
achieve the same result as the regulation under review and that the latter was
therefore necessary.82 In this way, the CJEU may be said to have deferred to the
law-maker’s own opinion vis-à-vis compliance with the proportionality principle
and thus reduced its role to simply checking whether the EU law-maker had
‘provided enough informative input justifying compliance with the principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity’.83
4.3 LUXEMBOURG V. PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL
A similar approach was taken in Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, where the
Court once again stipulated that the proportionality principle required the law-
maker to base its choices upon objective criteria.84 In deciding whether an EU
directive seeking to establish a common framework regulating the essential features
of airport charges breached the principle of proportionality, the Court, citing
Vodafone as authority, once again went on to note that the Commission had carried
out an IA which considered various different options before adopting the measure
currently under review.85 This then influenced the Court’s reasoning in dismissing
Luxembourg’s appeal, thus leading to the case being cited as further evidence of
the Court operating a more process-oriented approach to proportionality review
by primarily focusing not on the substance of the contested measure but on
80 Ibid., paras 61–68.
81 Ibid., para. [69].
82 Ibid., para. [68].
83 José A. Gutierrez-Fons, Transatlantic Adjudication Techniques: The Commerce Clause and the EU’s Internal
Market Harmonisation Clause in Perspective, in A Transatlantic Community of Law Legal Perspectives on the
Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders 69, 100 (Fahey & Curtin eds, CUP 2014).
84 Case C-176/09 Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council [2011] ECR I-03727, para. [50].
85 Ibid., paras 65–67.
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whether the institutions showed that they had examined different regulatory
options and assessed their impact.86
4.4 INUIT TAPIRIIT KANATAMI
Similarly, in Inuit the EGC explicitly cited Vodafone and the need to base
measures on ‘objective criteria’ before continuing the practice of making increased
reference to the process that led to the adoption of contested measures of EU law
by referring to the preparatory report of the Commission when concluding that
the measure was proportionate.87
In deciding whether a ban on seal products was proportionate, the CJEU
noted that the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation had been watered down
in the final Regulation adopted by the Parliament and Council. This ‘demon-
strates that the legislature specifically examined the situation in the Union which
called for that measure and considerably limited its scope in comparison with the
Commission proposal’ and that it must therefore ‘be concluded that the measures
provided for were strictly limited to those the legislature considered necessary in
order to eliminate the obstacles to free circulation of the products indicated.’88
In terms of whether less restrictive measures were available, the Court noted
that alternatives such as a labelling requirement were examined and rejected by the
legislature.89 In support of this finding, the Court simply cited two recitals to the
Regulation in which the EU law-maker, relying upon a report by the European
Food Safety Authority, asserted that it had examined less restrictive measures and
decided that they were unsuitable. It was to be concluded, therefore, that having
analysed different alternatives, the legislature took the view that they did not allow
the objective pursued to be met and that a general prohibition on the placing on
the market of seal products was the best means of guaranteeing the free movement
of goods.90
Just as in Vodafone and Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, therefore, it was
law-maker’s own opinion as to the suitability and necessity of the contested
measure, as evidenced by the outcome of the law-making process and reliance
upon preparatory documents, which was determinative and not the Court’s own
assessment of the merits of the contested measure. Finally, the Court did not
86 Groussot & Bogojevi!, supra n. 9, at 246.
87 Case T-526/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. European Commission [2013] ECLI:EU:T:2013:
paras 90–103.
88 Ibid., para. [90].
89 Ibid., para. [95].
90 Ibid., para. [96].
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engage in the third step of the proportionality test, citing the applicant’s failure to
adequately substantiate their positon on this point.91
It is generally accepted that all such cases evidence a general trend towards a
more process-oriented approach to judicial review.92 The CJEU’s insistence upon
the need for the EU law-maker to base its measures upon ‘objective criteria’ and its
subsequent citation of IAs and the explanatory memoranda at several different
stages of its proportionality reasoning has been hailed as ‘revolutionary’ in CJEU
jurisprudence.93 It has been said that under this more process-oriented approach to
proportionality review, the Court now requires the EU law-maker to present and
explain material relied upon during the law-making process in order to justify its
actions.94
Others have proposed that in the above case-law the Court seems to base its
conclusion that the contested measure was proportionate, in part at least, upon ‘the
question of whether the infringing Act was enacted through a process that included
procedural requirements such as consultation procedures, appropriate investiga-
tions and studies, and sufficient parliamentary debate.’95
It has been suggested that this process-oriented approach to proportionality
review, particularly in Vodafone and Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council, continues
the line of reasoning established in Spain v. Council that the EU institutions must
now show that they took all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation
they intended to regulate into account before exercising their discretion to adopt
the act in question.96
However, this is by no means clear from the explicit wording of the Court’s
decisions. Indeed, the Court in Vodafone and other subsequent cases has neither
cited Spain v. Council nor the novel proportionality test established therein –
instead simply requiring that the measure at issue be based on ‘objective criteria’.
The only exception to this is the decision in Afton Chemical where the Court
explicitly repeated verbatim the ‘actually exercised its discretion’ test and cited
Spain v. Council as authority for doing so. Rather confusingly, though, it did so
91 Ibid., para. [98].
92 Patricia Popelier, Preliminary Comments on the Role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs, 6 Legisprudence,
257, 262 (2012); Lenaerts, supra n. 1.
93 Groussot & Bogojevi!, supra n. 9, at 246; Isidora Maleti!, The Role of the Principle of Subsidiarity in the
EU’s Lifestyle Risk Policy, in Regulating Lifestyle Risks: The EU, Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets 197,
209 (Alberto Alemanno & Amandine Garde eds, CUP 2014).
94 Keyaerts, supra n. 54, at 280.
95 Ittai Bar-Simon-Tov, Semiprocedural Judicial Review, 6 Legisprudence 271, 274 (2012). According to
Bouckaert, under process-oriented review ‘the control of the legal validity of an act is not limited to
the final regulatory act, but concerns also the process of its legal genesis’. B. Bouckaert, Law Is Politics
and Often Also Policy, in Policy Within and Through Law: Proceedings of the 2014 ACCA-conference 45, 58
(De Bruyne & others eds, Maklu Publishing 2015).
96 Lenaerts, supra n. 1, at 7; Groussot & Bogojevi!, supra n. 9, at 246.
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when examining whether the law-maker had committed a ‘manifest error of
assessment’, which often operates as a substantive ground of review distinct from
proportionality.97
4.5 GAUWEILER
The recent Grant Chamber decision in Gauweiler offers the most compelling
example to date that the proportionality principle is now being applied in a
procedural fashion by the Court in certain circumstances.
The case concerned the first ever preliminary reference from the German BvG
on the question of whether the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions pro-
gramme, as announced in a press release, was legal under EU law. The case raises
a number of complex constitutional issues which cannot be addressed here.98
Focusing purely on the Court’s approach to proportionality review, it first began
by taking a two-step approach in which acts of the EU institutions must be
appropriate for attaining the objectives pursued and do not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.99 In conducting such an enquiry,
the CJEU held that since the ECSB is required to make choices of a technical
nature and to undertake forecasts and complex assessments, it must be allowed a
broad discretion.100
From here, however, the Court introduced yet another (and to date the most
process-oriented) formulation of proportionality review, this time explicitly con-
necting it to the duty to provide reasons as enshrined in Article 296 TFEU:
Nevertheless, where an EU institution enjoys broad discretion, a review of compliance
with certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental importance. Those guarantees include
the obligation for the ESCB to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements
of the situation in question and to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its
decisions.101
Accordingly, what was implicit in the Court’s proportionality reasoning in Spain
v. Council is made explicit in Gauweiler: in certain areas where the EU law-maker
enjoys broad discretion, merits based proportionality review has been effectively
97 Case C 343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-07027 57. The
decision of the CJEU clearly deals with whether a manifest error of assessment had been committed
(paras 28–42) independently of whether the contested measure breached the principle of proportion-
ality (paras 43–69). See also fn. 74.
98 For an analysis see Alicia Hinarejos, Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme: The
Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and Monetary Union, 11 Eur.
Const. L. Rev. 563 (2015).
99 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others [2015] not yet reported, para. [67].
100 Ibid., para. [68].
101 Ibid., para. [69].
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replaced by a procedural obligation to justify measures of EU law by providing a
statement of reasons.102 Interestingly, in formulating this version of the propor-
tionality principle as being inextricably linked with the Article 296 TFEU proce-
dural duty to give reasons, the CJEU, like the Advocate General, did not make any
reference to the ‘manifestly inappropriate’ standard of review that has been almost
unanimously used in its prior proportionality jurisprudence. Instead, the Court
stipulated at the necessity stage of its enquiry that it was restricted to examining
whether the measure manifestly goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its
objectives.103
In conducting the suitability step of the proportionality test, the CJEU simply
referred to the press release and the explanations provided by the ECB that the
programme is based on an analysis of the economic situation in the Euro Area.104
It then concluded, once again taking the arguments of the ECB at face value
without any scrutiny, that in light the information placed before the Court in ‘it
does not appear that that analysis of the economic situation of the Euro Area as at
the date of the announcement of the programme in question is vitiated by a
manifest error of assessment.’105
From this, the Court recognized the virtually unlimited discretion of the
ESCB in this area, effectively stating that nothing can be done to review the
suitability of the disputed measure:
In that regard, the fact, mentioned by the referring court, that that reasoned analysis has
been subject to challenge does not, in itself, suffice to call that conclusion into question,
since, given that questions of monetary policy are usually of a controversial nature and in
view of the ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be required of the ESCB apart
from that it use its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its disposal to
carry out that analysis with all care and accuracy.106
This leads to a somewhat circular form of reasoning: (i) the applicants are challen-
ging the suitability of the measure; (ii) the Court says that measures must indeed be
suitable; (iii) but the Court then grants such a wide margin of discretion to the
ECSB that suitability review can only involve an examination of whether the
ESCB has used ‘its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its
disposal to carry out that analysis with all care and accuracy’; (iv) but any challenge
to the care and accuracy of such analysis cannot be challenged; (v) because the
ECSB has such broad discretion.
102 Sauter, supra n. 71.
103 Gauweiler and Others, supra n. 99, para. [81].
104 Ibid., paras 72–73.
105 Ibid., para. [74].
106 Ibid., para. [75].
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That being said, there may of course be good reasons for judicial restraint
when scrutinizing policy decisions of the ECB given its nature as an expert body
and its independence under the Treaties.107 It has long been established that the
CJEU should not substitute its own preferences for that of the initial decision
making body at the Union level just because it would have decided differently had
it been entrusted to take such decisions. Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysing
process-oriented review, it is clear from the reasoning of the Court here that it is
merely concerned with checking that some form of statement of reasons has been
given by the law-maker for its actions. The Court is thus not concerned with the
accuracy of evidence relied upon by the ECB nor the conclusions drawn from
such evidence when formulating monetary policy.
According to Hofmann, the Court’s shift towards a procedural conception of
proportionality stems from the fact that cases like Gauweiler which involve highly
technical, information intensive activities are very difficult to monitor via traditional,
merits based judicial review.108 As a result, in situations where such intricacy results
in fewer possibilities for the Court to engage in the substance of a contested measure,
an enhanced reliance is placed upon procedural requirements, such as demonstrating
that all relevant measures were taken into consideration before law-making and that
reasons were provided for adopting particular measures.109 Accordingly, Gauweiler
is a case which confirms and reinforces the trend towards process-oriented review in
the EU legal order in which substantive, merits based proportionality review takes
on a form more akin to the procedural duty to state reasons.110
Further support comes from Goldmann who has stated that:
Instead of a full review, the proportionality test bears a largely procedural character. The
ECJ establishes that the ECB was under a duty to provide sufficient reasons, which it
derives mutatis mutandis from Article 296(2) TFEU. What follows is a plausibility test in
which the ECJ finds that the reasoning given by the ECB in support of its OMT program
is consistent and in line with certain features of the OMT program such as its selective
character and conditionality.111
107 Hinarejos, supra n. 98, at 575; M. Goldmann, Adjudicating Economics: Central Bank Independence and the
Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15 Ger. L.J. 265, 266 (2014).
108 Herwig Hofmann, Gauweiler and OMT: Lessons for EU Public Law and the European Economic and
Monetary Union, Working Paper, 16, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621933
(accessed 22 Jan. 2016); See also Hinarejos ‘The Court … sought to recognise the broad discretion
of the European Central Bank to make complex economic assessments and technical choices, while at
the same time striving to discharge a meaningful and necessary role … the Court did not want to be
seen to be second-guessing the expert body’s policy choices, so it focused on procedural requirements
and applied a light-touch review when it came to assessing the proportionality of the scheme.’ supra
n. 98, at 574.
109 Hofmann, supra n. 108, at 16.
110 Ibid.
111 Matthias Goldmann, Constitutional Pluralism as Mutually Assured Discretion: The Court of Justice, the
German Federal Constitutional Court, and the ECB, 23 Maastricht J. Eur. Comp. L. 119, 124 (2016).
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5 COMMENT
Whilst one must be cautious of reading too much into the Court’s reasoning in
Gauweiler given the truly exceptional nature of the case, it is clear from the above
jurisprudence and academic commentary as a whole that a fundamental reconcep-
tualization of the nature of the proportionality principle has taken place in recent
years. Whereas under its conventional understanding the Court was required to
determine whether the merits of a contested measure before it was proportionate
(albeit by adopting a very light touch approach), process-oriented review requires
the Court to check that adequate reasons have been provided by the law-maker to
demonstrate its own belief that it acted in compliance with the proportionality
principle.
A number of observations may be made in light of this. First, from a doctrinal
perspective one immediately sees considerable overlap between the essential pro-
cedural requirement to state reasons in Article 296 TFEU and a novel, process-
oriented approach to the proportionality principle that had hitherto been con-
ceived of as a substantive ground of judicial review. As has already been noted,
whilst the process/substance distinctions in judicial review at the EU level are
closely related, the two are to be kept conceptually distinct. To the extent that the
Court now focuses – via its proportionality assessment – upon whether the
arguments and justificatory evidence adduced by the law-maker adequately
demonstrate that it has taken all relevant facts and considerations into account,
however, it is clear that this distinction is becoming increasingly blurred. Indeed,
the cases cited above suggest that it was the adequacy of the reasoning provided by
the law-maker, and not the substantive content of the contested measure itself
(such as in ABNA, IATA etc.) which was determinative.
Furthermore, in light of the Court’s consistent finding that ‘in the exercise of
the powers conferred on it the [Union] legislature must be allowed a broad
discretion in areas in which its action involves political, economic and social
choices and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments and
evaluations’,112 it is possible that process-oriented proportionality review may
become the norm outside the fundamental rights context.113
The point at this stage is not to suggest that in the above cases a more robust
scrutiny of complex economic and technical data should have been conducted by
the Court. Nor is it to call into question the belief that such issues are best dealt
112 Supra n. 44.
113 In light of the above case law, those types of cases include: The Internal Market (Vodafone and Inuit);
The Common Agricultural Policy (Spain v. Council); Transport (Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council);
Economic and Monetary Union (Gauweiler). For a process-oriented approach to fundamental rights
review see Joined Cases C-92/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and C-93/09 Hartmut Eifert v. Land
Hessen [2010] ECR I-11063.
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with by law-maker’s and not Courts. It is, rather, that the gradual shift towards
process-oriented review in the reasoning of the Court illustrates that it may no
longer be correct from a conceptual point of view to understand proportionality in
the discretionary policymaking context as involving an examination of the merits
of contested measures in certain types of cases. This is aptly demonstrated by
Weatherill in his comments on the Vodafone case:
the Commission, having piloted the measure through the EU legislative process, then
advises the Court it is constitutionally justified – well, it would, wouldn’t it. The Court
did not stand outside the legislative choice that had been made. Instead it aligned itself
uncritically with the institutions whose choices were being challenged by the applicants.114
This is, of course, central to the perceived advantages of process-oriented review,
which is said to be preferable to its traditional, merits based formulation precisely
because it prevents the Court from intruding into the discretionary policymaking
activities of the law-maker whilst still managing to hold the EU law-maker to
account.115 ‘Proportionality analysis takes procedural requirements into account, in
particular when broad deference hinders a substantive assessment of legislation’116
In this regard, as Dyzenhaus has observed, judges in many legal systems have
traditionally felt more comfortable reviewing decisions on procedural than on
substantive grounds on the basis that ‘procedural review does not interfere with
the democratic mandate of the legislature both to make substantive decisions and
to delegate authority to make such decisions to administrative officials’117 This is
premised upon the belief that judges ‘should stay out of the business of reweighing
the reasons given by the official – a substantive exercise – and confine themselves
to the allegedly procedural exercise of checking that reasons were given.’118
According to this approach, courts should ‘defer to administrative interpretations
of the law when the reasons of the officials who made the decision provide a
reasonable basis for the decision.’119
114 This point is made in relation to the Court’s scrutiny of the legislature’s justifications for having
recourse to Art. 114 TFEU as a legal basis for Union action, but is nevertheless relevant to the closely
linked proportionality analysis in that case. Stephen Weatherill, The Limits of Legislative Harmonization
Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law Has Become a ‘Drafting Guide’, 12 German
L.J. 827, 842 (2011).
115 ‘These standards allow the Court to avoid completing an evaluation of its own, and to invalidate
legislation because of a lack of evidence of justification’ Meßerschmidt supra n. 6, at 356. See also
Lenaerts, supra n. 1.
116 Popelier, supra n. 92, at 257.
117 David Dyzenhaus, Process and Substance as Aspects of the Public Law Form, 74 Cambridge L.J. 284,
284–285 (2015).
118 ibid. 285.
119 David Dyzenhaus, Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justification, in Proportionality and the Rule of
Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 243, 239 (Huscroft, Miller & Webber eds, CUP 2014).
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Whilst this is not how the proportionality ground of review has traditionally
been conceived in the EU legal order,120 the above case law and commentary
suggests that judicial scrutiny of compliance with the principle has, to some extent
at least, shifted towards deferring to the assessment of the legislature itself with
respect to its own compliance with the principle provided some form of justifica-
tory evidence is adduced e.g. an IA. This would indeed appear to be confirmed by
Hofman’s reading of contemporary case law that ‘Increasingly … in the context of
review of legislative acts of the Union, the CJEU does not review the substance of
an act but instead checks whether the institutions can prove that they themselves
reviewed the proportionality of a measure before adopting it.’121 One sees this
clearly in cases like Vodafone and Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council where the
Court noted that the law-maker had examined various different options which
were summarized in an IA before taking action and then deferred to the EU law-
maker’s own opinions and assessments as to why the contested measure complied
with the principle of proportionality.
It has been said that ‘Ultimately, the extent to which process review is accepted,
depends upon the conception of democratic rule or legitimacy dominant within a given legal
system.’122
In light of this, it is important to note that process-oriented review as devel-
oped by the CJEU has been claimed to share similarities with procedural theories
of democracy and judicial review within the United States literature.123 The locus
classicus here is John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust which promulgates an
alternative to substantive judicial review in which courts play a ‘representation
reinforcing’ role by interfering only to the extent that the processes of law-making
are deficient.124 ‘That is the simple, powerful thesis of Democracy and Distrust: the
courts should be in the business of reinforcing and perfecting, not second-guessing,
the work of representative government.’125
The central premise of Democracy and Distrust is that substantive judicial review
is counter-majoritarian and therefore prima facie incompatible with democratic
theory.126 Based upon this, Ely sought to develop an approach to judicial review
120 ‘[T]aking into account that the main function of [proportionality analysis] is to secure a legal safeguard
for the parties affected by the legislative or administrative measures in question, it must imply the
judicial review of the merits of the decision’ Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of Proportionality Analysis in
European Law 227 (Hotei Publishing 2015).
121 Hofmann, supra n. 12, at 205.
122 Popelier, supra n. 92, at 261.
123 Lenaerts, supra n. 1; Groussot & Bogojevi!, supra n. 9.
124 John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust – A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press 1980).
125 David A Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of John Hart Ely, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 761, 761 (2004).
126 Ely, supra n. 124, at 4–5, 7–8, 11–12.
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that, ‘unlike its rival value protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the
contrary (and quite by design) entirely supportive of … representative
democracy.’127 He argued that rather than dictating substantive outcomes or
protecting substantive constitutional values, courts should only intervene when
the political process malfunctions.128 According to Ely, therefore, the basic
assumption of the US constitutional system is that legislative majorities are ordi-
narily entitled to get their own way. As a result, judges should as a default rule
defer to the democratically legitimate outcomes of the political process:
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution as ‘an enduring but
evolving statement of general values’, … in fact the selection and accommodation of
substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process and instead the document is
overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of
individual disputes (process writ small), and on the other, what might capaciously be
designated process writ large – with ensuring broad participation the processes and
distributions of government.129
For Ely, judicial review that focuses on ensuring that the political process
functions correctly, rather than upon the substantive outcomes of those processes,
is not only more legitimate from a democratic perspective, but also, ‘again in
contradistinction to its rival [substantive judicial review], involves tasks that courts,
as experts on process and … as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better
qualified and situated to perform than political officials.’130
The important point to note from this is that Ely and most other process
theorists in the United States do not seek to replace substantive judicial review in
its entirety. Instead, they use ‘process-based theories to justify some version of
substantive judicial review and to delineate the areas in which substantive judicial
review is legitimate.’131
Whilst a full analysis of the normative desirability of procedural theories of
judicial review for the EU legal order must be left for another time, the above
analysis necessarily poses the question of whether such a procedural approach to
judicial review (particularly in those proportionality cases where fundamental rights
are not a predominant issue) is well-suited to the EU system of policymaking?
127 Ibid., at 88.
128 Ibid., at 102–103.
129 Ibid., at 87.
130 Ibid., at 88. The relative expertize of courts when it comes to matters of procedure as opposed to
substantive policy decisions has also been invoked in support of procedural approaches to judicial
review in common law legal systems (particularly the United Kingdom). See David Mead,
Outcomes aren’t all: defending process-based review of public authority decisions under the Human Rights
Act, Pub. L. 79 (2012).
131 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 Boston
U. L. Rev. 1959 (2011).
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It has been said that the ‘counter-majoritarian’ difficulty is virtually non-
existent in the EU context since there is less democracy at the EU level132; thus
arguably rendering the central target of Ely and other procedural theorist’s work
inapplicable to judicial review in the EU. Essentially this critique rests on the view
that it has been the inability to ‘develop structures and processes which adequately
replicate or, “translate,”133 at the Union level, even the imperfect habits of
governmental control, parliamentary accountability, and administrative responsi-
bility that are practiced with different modalities in the various member states.’134
With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, however, the democratic
credentials of the Union have been enhanced to a considerable extent. In other
words, the functional premise upon which judicial review was based in the early
years of European integration has been replaced, or at least complemented to a
considerable extent, by considerations of democratic legitimacy. In this regard, ‘[t]
he Lisbon Treaty represents a dramatic step towards political Union.’135 The
revised TEU now contains a separate title on ‘democratic principles’136 of which
Article 10 TEU is the central provision. It provides that the ‘functioning of the
Union shall be founded on representative democracy’. This is envisaged as operat-
ing in both a direct and an indirect manner: Article 10(2) TEU provides that
European citizens are to be represented directly at the Union level by the
European Parliament; whereas Article 10(3) states that they are also indirectly
represented through their Member States in the Council. ‘This dual democratic
legitimacy of the Union corresponds to its federal nature.’137
Furthermore, Article 289(3) TFEU now provides that ‘legal acts adopted by
legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts’, meaning that one may now
formally define ‘legislation’ in the EU legal order as an act adopted by the
bicameral Union legislator, albeit operating under different procedures depending
on the subject matter of the legislation.138
The introduction of the term ‘legislative procedure’ is potentially of immense
significance here. As Bast notes, the exercise of legislative power means something
more than simply producing rules and regulations of any kind or form. Legislation
132 M. Rosenfeld, Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme
Court, 4 Intl. J. Const. L. 618, 631 (2006).
133 Neil Walker, Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in European Constitutionalism
Beyond the State, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Weiler & Wind eds, CUP 2003)
27, 27–29.
134 Joseph Weiler, Van Gend en Loos: The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma of European
Legitimacy, 12(1) I•CON 94–103, 100
135 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law 43 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
136 Title II TEU.
137 Schütze, supra n. 135, at 44.
138 Art. 289 (1) and 289 (2) TFEU. On the difference between the ordinary legislative procedure and the
various special legislative procedures see Schütze, supra n. 135, at Ch. 5.
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evokes a mode of law-making by elected representatives and thus a democratic
form of coupling the spheres of law and politics.139
Accordingly, can one say that the degree of democratic legitimacy now
wielded under the ordinary legislative procedure has reached such a stage as to
warrant consideration of the counter-majoritarian difficulty at the EU level? And if
so, does the Court’s more process-oriented approach to reviewing legislative acts
in recent years give one cause for contemplating the normative desirability of
procedural theories of democracy and judicial review for the EU moving forward?
6 THE QUESTION OF THRESHOLDS
Should process-oriented proportionality become an established practice at the EU
level, the central question to be resolved in such cases will be one of thresholds:
what will it take to convince the CJEU that all relevant facts and considerations
have been taken into account? What precisely is required of the law-maker when
demonstrating that it based its measures on ‘objective criteria’? In light of the wide
discretion afforded to the law-maker, is the Court willing to engage in the
substantive contents of such justificatory evidence?
In this regard the Court has yet to definitively pronounce on what constitutes
adequate evidence in order to satisfy the ‘actually exercised its discretion, which
presupposes the taking into consideration all the relevant factors and circumstances of
the situation the act was intended to regulate’140; ‘based upon objective criteria’141 or
‘examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the situation in
question’142 formulations of the proportionality test. Nor has it indicated where
the outer limits of the obligation ‘to give an adequate statement of the reasons for its
decisions’ lies.143 What is more, it is unclear whether different legal consequences
flow from the differences in formulation here.
Furthermore, in terms of the impact that such an approach to judicial review
may have upon the quality of laws passed at the EU level, it has been noted that
courts can indeed contribute to enhancing the rationality of law-making by
indicating that measures supported by vigorous deliberation and strong evidence
will be more likely to survive judicial review.144 In this regard, ‘once the legislator
knows that a rational procedure of law-making helps to defend borderline cases,
139 Jürgen Bast, New Categories of Acts after the Lisbon Reform: Dynamics of Parliamentarization in EU Law,
49(3) Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 885–927, 891 (2012).
140 Spain v. Council, supra n. 60, para. [122].
141 Vodafone, supra n. 77, para. [53]; Luxembourg, supra n. 84, para. [50]; Inuit, supra n. 87, para. [89].
142 Gauweiler and Others, supra n. 99, para. [69].
143 Ibid., para. [69] emphasis added.
144 Alemanno, supra n. 74, at 501.
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they will be eager to prove to judicial review that the law under scrutiny resulted
from well informed and responsible deliberation.’145
This further highlights the importance of thresholds in process-oriented pro-
portionality review. In this regard, it would appear that the level of justificatory
evidence the Court deems must be adduced by the law-maker in order to satisfy
proportionality review is rather low. To date, the jurisprudence suggests that
absent evidence being lacking entirely (e.g. Spain v. Council) all evidence adduced
by the law-maker will be accepted at face value, thus leading to the suspicion that
scrutiny of contested measures is effectively being operated in a box-ticking
fashion.
Illustrative here is the Court’s approach to IAs when considering the propor-
tionality of contested measures. As was noted above, in a series of cases the CJEU
has uncritically accepted the findings of ex- ante IAs as evidence that the law-
maker had considered various options before enacting the contested measure and
thus had complied with the principle of proportionality. This is neatly encapsulated
by Brenncke’s observation that in Vodafone the Court did not actually engage
with the substance of the contested measure at all: ‘the Court … referred to the
impact assessment and the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a regula-
tion and adopted the study’s findings as expressed in these documents without
scrutinizing their merit.’146
Can we conclude from this that the production of an IA purporting to have
considered all relevant facts, circumstances and alternative options before enacting
the contested measure is in and of itself sufficient to satisfy the Court that its
process-oriented conception of the proportionality principle has been complied
with?147
For an alternative state of affairs to be possible, the Court would have to
conduct a review into the substantive accuracy of facts relied on by the EU law-
maker and/or the scope of consultation and quality of reasoning of pre-legislative
documents such as IAs. The issue would then be whether the Court can second
guess the findings or methods deployed in such documents, and whether it is
obliged to accept whatever conclusions they make?148 For example, the Court
would have to be willing to decide that a particular IA is so defective that reliance
upon it by the law-maker renders the subsequently enacted measure manifestly
inappropriate and thus illegal.
145 Meßerschmidt, supra n. 6, at 353.
146 Martin Brenncke, Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 June 2010, 2010), 47 Com. Mkt.
L. Rev. 1793, 1809 (2010).
147 For a discussion of Impact Assessments and their potential uses in judicial review see Paul Craig,
The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis, 48 Com. Mkt. L. Rev. 395, 411–412 (2011).
148 Vandenbruwaene, supra n. 65, at 342.
118 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
Given the degree of discretion afforded to the law-maker in such cases, however,
it is questionable whether the Court would wish to interfere in the substantive
conclusions drawn from such documents, thus suggesting that the mere production
of such preparatory documentation may suffice to ensure compliance with the
proportionality principle.149 On the one hand, it might be the case that ‘the more
the Court requires from the Commission in procedural terms, e.g. disclosing its
assessment of different possible policy options through an impact study, the more it
will alleviate the marginal judicial review of the substantive issues which a “manifestly
inappropriate” standard entails.’150 On the other, it is at least plausible that reliance on
such documents does not simply reduce the intensity of substantive review, but
effectively replaces it entirely and leads to a mere box ticking exercise by the Court.
In seeking to demonstrate the implications that this may have for applicants
seeking to challenge measures of Union law where process-oriented proportion-
ality review is applied, the recent decision in Estonia v. Parliament and Council is
worthy of note.151 Estonia challenged an EU Directive which sought to simplify
the accounting requirements for small companies, arguing that its own national
rules were drawn up using a model of international financial reporting standards
which required additional information than the contested Directive.152 According
to the applicants, the Commission had committed an error of assessment in the
criteria used at the stage of the IA by using as a basis mainly quantitative indicators
concerning the number of small undertakings, instead of relying on qualitative
indicators such as the market share of sales of those small undertakings in the
national economy. In Estonia’s view, small undertakings contribute more strongly
than in other Member States to the turnover of undertakings as a whole in their
country. Accordingly, certain provisions of the Directive disregarded the obliga-
tions imposed upon the EU law-maker in Article 5 of Protocol No 2 annexed to
the Treaties in which draft legislative acts should contain, inter alia, some assess-
ment of the proposal’s financial impact and, in the case of a directive, of its
implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States.153,154
In contrast, the Commission argued that Estonia’s criticisms of its IA were
unproven since that analysis was carried out ‘using the appropriate procedure by an
149 Support for this comes from the observation that ‘These … cases thus appear to herald a change in the
way that efforts to examine a potential breach of the principle of proportionality … are carried out
using impact assessments. However, as long as these assessments make a favourable finding, it seems
that the Court will accept those reasons on their face value.’ Groussot & Bogojevi!, supra n. 9, at 247.
150 Brenncke, supra n. 146, at 1809–1810.
151 Case C- 508/13 Estonia v. Parliament and Council [2015], not yet reported.
152 Ibid., para. [20].
153 Ibid.
154 Art. 5, Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed
to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the
Treaty of Lisbon of 13 Dec. 2007.
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external contractor, after consulting the relevant committee and taking into
account the situation both of the EU and of each Member State.’155
In response, the Court found that the EU legislature must be allowed broad
discretion in the area concerned and that accordingly the ‘manifestly inappropriate’
standard applied.156 There was, however, no need for the EU law-maker to
demonstrate that it had ‘actually exercised its discretion’ or based its decisions
upon ‘objective criteria’ as in previous case law: thus raising considerable confusion
as to when a more process-oriented approach will be adopted by the Court.
Ultimately, the CJEU disposed of the case rather swiftly, finding that Estonia
had failed to demonstrate why the measure was not necessary and had thus not
included in its plea ‘sufficient evidence to demonstrate the manifestly inappropriate
nature of the measures adopted by the EU legislature.’157
In so doing, however, the CJEU avoided the issue of whether it was possible
to challenge the substantive quality of IAs before the Court; refusing to address
both the applicant’s contention that the IA was based upon incorrect criteria and
the Commission’s response.
Whilst one must keep in mind the non-legally binding nature of IAs, a problem
potentially presents itself here. As we have seen above, the Court has been willing to
accept IAs and other preparatory documents as evidence of the EU law-maker’s
compliance with the principle of proportionality. However, given that a more
process-oriented approach to proportionality has effectively meant a replacement
of low-intensity merits based review with a procedural, reasons giving requirement,
the CJEU has to date been willing to accept such evidence at face value.
As a result, a trend is possibly emerging in which the EU institutions are free
to rely upon IAs and other preparatory documents to support their assertion that
contested measures have been adequately justified in terms of their compliance
with the principle of proportionality, and these findings will be accepted by the
Court without any degree of scrutiny whatsoever, whereas applicants appear to be
precluded from challenging the methodology or findings of such assessments.158
Furthermore, given that evidence of a more rational, deliberative form of law-
making may render contested measures more robust in judicial review proceed-
ings, it is to be anticipated that the Court’s willingness to accept preparatory
documents such as IAs as evidence of compliance with the proportionality prin-
ciple will lead to the Union law-maker routinely turning to such documents to
155 Estonia, supra n. 151, para [26].
156 Ibid., para. [29].
157 Ibid., paras 35–37.
158 This is all the more troubling when one considers that Impact Assessments have been criticized on a
number of fronts, including their factual accuracy and scope of consultation. For an early overview of
such concerns see Caroline Cecot and others, An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact Assessment in the
European Union with Lessons for the US and the EU, 2 Reg. & Governance 405 (2008).
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defend its decisions. Once again, this raises the question of just how far down this
road the Court is willing to go before it would consider evaluating the substantive
merits of such preparatory documents or whether, when faced with such justifi-
catory evidence, the Court will in all cases simply accept them at face value less it
be accused of overstepping the boundaries of its judicial powers.
7 CONCLUSION
The past decade or so has seen a gradual shift taking place within the case-law of
the CJEU away from a low-intensity scrutiny of the merits of contested measures
of Union law via the proportionality principle towards a more process-oriented
conception of review. In so doing, it has been contended by the Court’s recently
elected President and other seasoned commentators that such an approach prevents
the Court from intruding into the realm of discretionary policy making whilst still
being to hold law-maker’s at the Union level to account. Whilst there may be
much of merit to such an approach – particularly in light of the twin concerns of
judicial interference in highly technical areas of law-making and the judiciary
substituting its judgment for that of the Union’s law-making institutions – the
manner in which it has operated to date leaves a number of questions unanswered.
From a doctrinal perspective, the Court has been inconsistent in its formula-
tion of a more process-oriented proportionality principle, using different termi-
nology across different case-law as well as conflating the hitherto substantive
ground of review with the procedural duty to state reasons in Article 296
TFEU. Furthermore, in terms of the level of scrutiny actually achieved by
process-oriented review, the admittedly limited number of cases to date hint at a
willingness by the Court to accept the EU’s law-making institutions own views
vis-à-vis compliance with the principle of proportionality without engaging in the
substantive merits of the contested measures itself. In particular, the Court’s
acceptance of preparatory documents such as IAs at face value as evidence of
compliance with the proportionality principle has led to the suspicion of a box
ticking approach being adopted. The potential problems associated with such an
approach are highlighted by the Court’s reluctance recently in Estonia v. Parliament
and Council to engage in the applicant’s challenge to the accuracy and quality of IAs
relied upon by the law-maker when enacting a measure under review. Should such
a practice continue, a situation may arise in which the Union’s law-making
institutions may shield their measures from annulment by relying upon preparatory
documents of potentially contestable quality and accuracy which applicants are
effectively precluded from challenging.
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